1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	SAN JOSE DIVISION
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6	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ) C-17-00220 LHK )
7	PLAINTIFF, ) SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA )
8	VS. ) JANUARY 29, 2019 )
9	QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, A ) VOLUME 11 DELAWARE CORPORATION, )
10	) PAGES 2095-2183 DEFENDANT. )
11	)
12	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE LUCY H. KOH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14	APPEARANCES:
15	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
16	BY: JENNIFER MILICI  DANIEL J. MATHESON  WESLEY C. CARCON
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23	CERTIFICATE NUMBER 9595 IRENE RODRIGUEZ, CSR, CRR, RMR CERTIFICATE NUMBER 8074
24	PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY
25	TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED WITH COMPUTER

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2	APPEARANCES (CONTINUE	
3		
4	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS BY: ROBERT A. VAN NEST
5		JUSTINA K. SESSIONS EUGENE M. PAIGE
6		CHRISTINA BLAIS MATAN SHACHAM
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20		BY: ERIC B. HALL DANIEL LEVENTHAL
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23	ALSO PRESENT:	MARK SNYDER JEFF DAHM
24		KEN KOTARSKI
25		
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21	(MR. VAN NEST GAVE HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF
22	QUALCOMM.)
23	MR. VAN NEST: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR.
24	THE EVIDENCE YOU'VE HEARD DURING TRIAL ABOUT WHAT ACTUALLY
25	TOOK PLACE IN THE MARKET SIMPLY WILL NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF

1	ANY VIOLATION.
2	THE FTC FAILED TO SHOW ACTUAL HARM TO COMPETITION. THEY
3	FAILED TO SHOW THAT QUALCOMM'S LICENSING PRACTICES HAVE BEEN
4	ANTICOMPETITIVE, AND THE EVIDENCE IS SIMPLY OVERWHELMING THAT
5	QUALCOMM EARNED ITS POSITION AND SUCCESS THROUGH SUPERIOR
6	INNOVATION AND BETTER PRODUCTS.
7	TO ESTABLISH A VIOLATION, IT WAS THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW
8	SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO COMPETITION RESULTING FROM QUALCOMM'S
9	CONDUCT.
10	THEY HAVE ABSOLUTELY FAILED TO DO THAT. THE MARKET IS
11	THRIVING. EVERYONE AGREES THIS IS A DYNAMIC AND HIGHLY
12	INNOVATIVE MARKET.
13	PARTICIPANTS ARE THRIVING. COMPETITION IS GROWING AND
14	INTENSE.
15	INTEL IS NOW THE SOLE SUPPLIER FOR NEW IPHONES FROM APPLE.
16	MEDIATEK IS THE NUMBER 2 SUPPLIER IN THE WORLD.
17	SAMSUNG AND HUAWEI ARE NOW SUPPLYING MANY OF THEIR OWN
18	CHIPS.
19	AND CONSUMERS ARE BENEFITING, TOO, YOUR HONOR. AS YOU
20	HEARD YESTERDAY FROM PROFESSOR SHAPIRO, QUALITY IS UP,
21	PERFORMANCE IS UP, AVERAGE SMARTPHONE PRICES ARE DOWN, AND ALL
22	THE EXPERTS AGREE.
23	THE FTC HAS PRESENTED EVIDENCE OF A HANDFUL OF OEM'S
24	CLAIMING THEY FELT THREATENED DURING LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS. I

WANT TO PUT THAT IN CONTEXT, AND I WILL.

1 THESE ARE ALL LARGE, SOPHISTICATED COMPANIES, ALL WITH THEIR OWN LEVERAGE, WHO NO DOUBT WANT TO PAY LESS FOR 2 3 QUALCOMM'S TECHNOLOGY. THE WITNESSES WERE LAWYERS. THE TESTIMONY WAS COMPLETELY SELF-SERVING. 4 5 THE FULL PICTURE IS THAT QUALCOMM HAS NEVER CUT OFF 6 COMMERCIAL CHIP SUPPLY TO ANY CUSTOMER DURING ANY LICENSING NEGOTIATION, EVER. AND THEY MADE NO ATTEMPT, THE FTC DID, TO 8 SHOW THAT EVEN IN THIS HANDFUL OF EXAMPLES, THE NEGOTIATED 9 OUTCOMES, WHICH OFTEN TOOK MONTHS, WOULD HAVE BEEN ANY 10 DIFFERENT IN A BUT FOR WORLD. 11 THE EXPERT TESTIMONY THEY PRESENTED WAS WEAK. 12 MR. LASINSKI CAME IN HERE WITH A MADE-FOR-LITIGATION MODEL THAT 13 NO COURT HAS ACCEPTED OR ENDORSED. 14 HIS TOP-DOWN APPROACH IS ARBITRARY AND CONTRADICTED BY 15 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HUNDREDS OF LICENSES SIGNED BY OUALCOMM 16 AND INDUSTRY PLAYERS FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS. 17 AND AS I SAID REPEATEDLY, PROFESSOR SHAPIRO IS ALL ABOUT 18 THEORY, BUT NO EMPIRICAL FACTS TO BACK IT UP. HE SIMPLY IGNORES WHAT HAPPENED IN THE MARKET. HE PREDICTS INEVITABLE 19 20 HARM, BUT HE DIDN'T LOOK AT ANY ACTUAL OUTCOME OR CONSIDER ANY 2.1 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION. 22 A THEORY OF HARM IS NOT ACTUAL HARM, AND IT'S NOT ENOUGH 23 TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN.

QUALCOMM'S ROYALTY RATES CAME INTO EXISTENCE, AS YOUR HONOR KNOWS, BEFORE ITS TECHNOLOGY WAS IN ANY STANDARD AND

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1 BEFORE IT HAD A CHIP BUSINESS OF ANY KIND.

AND QUALCOMM'S COMPETITORS HAVE COME AND GONE AND SUCCEEDED AND FAILED FOR A HOST OF REASONS THAT HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH QUALCOMM.

NOR ARE QUALCOMM'S LICENSING PRACTICES ANTICOMPETITIVE.

DEVICE LEVEL LICENSING IS ABSOLUTELY INDUSTRY STANDARD.

WITNESS AFTER WITNESS, INCLUDING FROM OUR COMPETITORS AND FROM

THE FTC, AGREED THAT DEVICE LEVEL LICENSING IS INDUSTRY

STANDARD AND HAS BEEN AROUND FOREVER.

THEY ALSO AGREE TO THE COROLLARY OF THAT. IT FLOWS JUST LIKE ANYTHING ELSE. CHIP LEVEL LICENSING IS NOT CUSTOMARY WHEN DEVICE LEVEL LICENSING IS PREVALENT. THAT'S THE WAY THE INDUSTRY HAS OPERATED FOR YEARS AND QUALCOMM IS WITHIN THAT TRADITION.

NOW, QUALCOMM'S PRACTICE OF SELLING CHIPS ONLY TO LICENSED OEM'S, THAT IS UNIQUE, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE QUALCOMM'S BUSINESS IS UNIQUE. IT HAS CREATED END-TO-END SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY, AND POPULAR CHIPS, AND IT'S ENTITLED TO A FAIR RETURN ON BOTH.

AND FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, IT'S NOW UNDISPUTED THAT QUALCOMM

ACHIEVED ITS SUCCESS THROUGH INNOVATION, BETTER ENGINEERING,

AND BETTER PRODUCTS. QUALCOMM'S TECHNOLOGY HAS DRIVEN THE

INDUSTRY FORWARD FROM 3G, 4G, AND 5G.

AND I WELCOME THE FTC'S ADMISSION, NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER TWO YEARS OF LITIGATION, THAT QUALCOMM EARNED ITS MARKET SHARE THROUGH INNOVATION.

1	THEY CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. IT CAN'T BE TRUE THAT OUR
2	TECHNOLOGY IS WASHED UP AND NOT WORTH THE ROYALTY RATES, AND
3	YET SO STRONG AND POWERFUL IN 5G THAT QUALCOMM MUST BE STOPPED.
4	ITS PRODUCTS ARE SIMPLY BETTER THAN ANYBODY ELSE'S, AS ALL
5	THE CUSTOMERS AND CHIP MAKERS ADMITTED, AND YEAR AFTER YEAR
6	THEY'RE WINNING BASED ON THAT TECHNOLOGY.
7	NOW, I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY, YOUR HONOR, TO
8	SUMMARIZE THE EVIDENCE IN MORE DETAIL, AND I WANT TO START WITH
9	THE FTC'S FAILURE OF PROOF OF ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM.
10	THEY HAVE THE BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THE CHALLENGED
11	RESTRAINT THAT'S THE CONDUCT OF QUALCOMM HAS A
12	SUBSTANTIAL ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT.
13	TO ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF EITHER THE SHERMAN ACT OR
14	SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT, THEY MUST PROVE THAT QUALCOMM'S
15	PRACTICES HAD A SUBSTANTIAL ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT.
16	POTENTIAL HARM, CAPABILITY OF HARM, A THEORY OF HARM,
17	THOSE AREN'T ENOUGH, YOUR HONOR. THEY HAVE TO SHOW ACTUAL
18	HARM.
19	THEY HAVEN'T DONE IT.
20	THE INDUSTRY IS THRIVING, AS YOU HEARD FROM EVERY EXPERT
21	THAT APPEARED BEFORE YOU. THESE CHARTS WERE PRESENTED BY
22	PROFESSOR SNYDER AND NEVO.
23	CHIP PRICES ARE FALLING. HANDSET PRICES ARE FALLING.
24	DATA SPEEDS ARE ROCKETING UP. AND COST OF DATA HAS DROPPED TO
25	ALMOST NOTHING FOR CONSUMERS.

1	WHEN PROFESSOR SHAPIRO WAS HERE YESTERDAY, HE CALLED THIS
2	AN IMPRESSIVE PACE OF INNOVATION, AND IT'S A CRITICAL SIGN,
3	YOUR HONOR, OF A HEALTHY, COMPETITIVE MARKET.
4	AND THE MARKET IS DYNAMIC, AS THE EXPERTS ALSO AGREED,
5	INCLUDING PROFESSOR SHAPIRO.
6	MR. MOYNIHAN FROM MEDIATEK SAYS, COMPETITION WAS VERY,
7	VERY HIGH.
8	MR. MCGREGOR, WHOSE FACE I COULDN'T FIT ON THE SLIDE,
9	TESTIFIED THAT BROADCOM LEFT BECAUSE THE MARKET WAS INTENSELY
10	COMPETITIVE.
11	ALL THE EXPERTS AGREE, THIS IS FAST MOVING, HIGHLY
12	COMPETITIVE, DYNAMIC MARKET.
13	AND COMPETITION IS INCREASING, NOT DECREASING. QUALCOMM'S
14	SHARE, ACCORDING TO PROFESSOR SHAPIRO, OF WHAT HE CALLS THE
15	PREMIUM LTE MARKET FELL IN 2015 AND 2016 AS SAMSUNG, INTEL, AND
16	MEDIATEK CAME INTO THE MARKET.
17	BY DEFINITION, IF QUALCOMM'S MARKET SHARE IS FALLING,
18	COMPETITION FROM OTHERS IS ON THE RISE, ANOTHER KEY ELEMENT OF
19	A HEALTHY MARKET.
20	NOW, BOTH DR. SNYDER AND PROFESSOR SHAPIRO TESTIFIED THAT
21	IN A MARKET LIKE THIS WHERE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS KEY,
22	YOU'D ONLY EXPECT TO HAVE A FEW COMPETITORS, EXACTLY WHAT WE
23	HAVE TODAY.
24	NOW, COMPETITION IS ESPECIALLY STRONG IN THE PREMIUM
25	MARKET. MR. WYATT TESTIFIED THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE PREMIUM

1	HANDSET TIER HANDSET TIER IS PROVIDED BY THREE OEM'S,
2	SAMSUNG, HUAWEI, AND APPLE.
3	TAKE A LOOK, YOUR HONOR, AT WHERE QUALCOMM SITS AS OF THE
4	END OF 2017, EARLY 2018. THEIR SHARE OF PREMIUM TIER SHIPS AT
5	SAMSUNG IS DOWN TO 35 PERCENT BECAUSE SAMSUNG CAN NOW
6	SELF-SUPPLY.
7	HUAWEI IS SELF-SUPPLYING AND BUYING FROM OTHERS ENTIRELY
8	FOR PREMIUM DEVICES.
9	AND AT APPLE, AS YOUR HONOR HAS HEARD, INTEL HAS 100
10	PERCENT OF THE NEW DESIGN.
11	FOLKS ARE MOVING AWAY FROM QUALCOMM IN THE PREMIUM TIER.
12	I HEARD THE FTC CLAIM THAT PROFESSOR SNYDER DIDN'T DO
13	ANYTHING EMPIRICAL. THAT'S CERTAINLY NOT WHAT I HEARD.
14	HE EXPLAINED THAT INDEPENDENT FACTORS EXPLAIN WHAT
15	HAPPENED IN THE MARKET, AND HE IDENTIFIED THREE: FORESIGHT,
16	INVESTMENT, AND EXECUTION.
17	AND YOUR HONOR WILL RECALL THAT HE DID 14 CASE STUDIES,
18	THAT'S 14 MORE THAN SHAPIRO DID, AND HE LOOKED AT EVERY
19	COMPETITOR IN THE MARKET FOR THE LAST DECADE OR SO.
20	HE TESTIFIED HERE ABOUT TWO OR THREE OF THEM. INTEL WAS
21	LATE. THEY DIDN'T TAKE MS. EVANS'S ADVICE TO GET INTO CDMA.
22	MEDIATEK DID FINE FOLLOWING A FAST FOLLOWER STRATEGY.
23	BROADCOM LACKED FORESIGHT AND MISSED THE CDMA MARKET.
24	AND THAT'S WHAT TOOK PLACE.
25	THEY HAVE MADE NO EFFORT, NONE, TO SHOW THAT QUALCOMM'S

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1 CONDUCT CAUSED THE RESULTS FOR ANY OF THE CHIP MAKER
2 COMPETITORS. NOT ONE.
3 AND IT'S ALSO TRUE THAT THESE COMPETITORS MADE THEIR OWN

AND IT'S ALSO TRUE THAT THESE COMPETITORS MADE THEIR OWN BUSINESS DECISIONS. YOUR HONOR HEARD FROM A NUMBER OF THEM.

MR. MOYNIHAN TESTIFIED THAT MEDIATEK CHOSE TO ENTER THE WCDMA MARKET, WHICH IS MUCH BIGGER, AND THEY DECIDED NOT TO ENTER CDMA BECAUSE CDMA WAS PERCEIVED BY MANY TO BE A NICHE MARKET WITH A LIMITED FUTURE.

THAT'S WHY, ALTHOUGH MS. EVANS WAS PRESSING INTEL TO GET

CDMA TECHNOLOGY, IT TOOK HER FOUR YEARS TO DO IT. PEOPLE

DIDN'T PERCEIVE IT AS A LUCRATIVE MARKET, AND ONLY QUALCOMM

INVESTED, WHICH, AS THE FTC ADMITTED THIS THEIR CLOSING,

QUALCOMM IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR CDMA, AND THEY EARNED THEIR

POSITION THROUGH HARD WORK AND INVESTMENT.

AND PROFESSOR NEVO IS THE ONLY ONE TO HAVE PERFORMED ANY EMPIRICAL TESTS ON RATES. WHAT HE SHOWED US WAS THAT QUALCOMM'S ROYALTY RATES HAVE REMAINED CONSISTENT ACROSS TIME, ACROSS STANDARDS, AND ACROSS MARKETS.

THAT MEANS WHETHER YOU'RE IN A MARKET WHERE THEY CLAIM

MARKET POWER OR NOT, RATES ARE THE SAME. THEY DON'T GO UP WHEN

QUALCOMM'S ALLEGED TO HAVE MARKET POWER, THEY DON'T GO DOWN

WHEN QUALCOMM IS ALLEGED TO HAVE NO MARKET POWER.

NOW, HE LOOKED AT RATES, UPFRONT PAYMENTS, PERIODS BEFORE THE STANDARDS, PERIODS BEFORE CHIPS EXISTED, AND I THINK, YOUR HONOR, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING HE LOOKED AT IS THIS THAT'S ON

1 THE SCREEN NOW.

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THIS IS A BUT FOR WORLD. NOBODY IS CONTENDING THAT

QUALCOMM HAS MARKET POWER. THEY'VE GOT THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

IF PROFESSOR SHAPIRO THOUGHT QUALCOMM HAD MARKET POWER IN

WCDMA, HE HAD EVERY CHANCE TO PROVE IT.

THEY DON'T, AND NOT A SINGLE WITNESS HAS SAID SO.

AND IN THAT MARKET, WHICH IS THE BUT FOR WORLD WE OFTEN LOOK FOR IN CASES LIKE THIS, QUALCOMM'S RATES ARE CONSISTENT AND THE SAME, WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT THOSE RATES ARE BASED ON THE QUALITY OF QUALCOMM'S TECHNOLOGY AND THE QUALITY OF ITS PATENTS AND NOT ANYTHING ELSE.

NOW, PROFESSOR SHAPIRO CAME IN FOR THE FIRST TIME
YESTERDAY AND LOBBIED SOME CRITIQUES AT PROFESSOR NEVO. HE
CRITICIZED HIM FOR LOOKING AT THE 5 PERCENT CONTRACT RATE.

WELL, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S BEEN THEIR CASE THEORY FROM DAY ONE. THE COMPLAINT, PARAGRAPH 58, ALLEGES THAT OUR 5 PERCENT RATE IS ABOVE FRAND. THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE RELYING ON. THAT'S WHAT THEY'VE BASED THEIR CLAIM ON.

AND PROFESSOR SHAPIRO HASN'T SHOWN THAT LOOKING AT THE CONTRACT RATE IS ANY DIFFERENT THAN LOOKING AT EFFECTIVE RATES OR ANYTHING ELSE. HE'S DONE NO EMPIRICAL WORK WHATSOEVER.

NOW, PROFESSOR NEVO TESTIFIED THAT SOME LICENSES WERE REMOVED FROM HIS ANALYSIS BECAUSE THEY JUST DON'T FIT THE CLAIM.

LICENSES NEGOTIATED UNDER THE EYE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

1	CAN'T POSSIBLY BE INFLUENCED BY CHIP LEVERAGE. HE TOOK THOSE
2	OUT.
3	AND PROFESSOR SHAPIRO DOESN'T CLAIM THEY SHOULD COME BACK
4	IN.
5	AND THE ONLY OTHER LICENSES THAT HE REMOVED WERE LICENSES
6	WHERE EVERYTHING WAS PAID UPFRONT AND THERE'S VIRTUALLY NO WAY
7	TO DETERMINE AN EFFECTIVE RATE UNTIL YEARS LATER WHEN YOUR
8	SALES ARE DONE.
9	YOUR HONOR HAS AN EXHIBIT, I THINK IT'S A DEMONSTRATIVE,
10	CDX 204. CDX 204 HAS ALL THE COMPANIES THAT ARE IN NEVO'S
11	ANALYSIS AND A LOT OF THEM ARE THERE, HUAWEI, ALL THE CONTRACT
12	MANUFACTURERS, THE BIG PLAYERS IN CHINA, THEY'RE ALL THERE.
13	THERE ARE DOZENS OF THEM. AND THEY'RE AND THIS ANALYSIS
14	SHOWS, AND IT'S THE ONLY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN THE CASE, THAT
15	MARKET POWER PLAYS NO ROLE IN QUALCOMM'S ROYALTY RATES.
16	NOW, WHAT DID THEY BRING YOU?
17	MICHAEL LASINSKI. NO FINDING OF A ROYALTY OVERCHARGE
18	COULD POSSIBLY REST ON THIS TESTIMONY.
19	BY HIS OWN ADMISSION ON THE SCREEN, HE'S NOT AWARE OF
20	ANYBODY ELSE WHO APPROACHES IT THIS WAY AND NO ONE ELSE HAS
21	APPROVED IT.
22	HE TOOK TWO FLAWED INPUTS, SO-CALLED DEEMED SEPS, AND
23	APPROVED CONTRIBUTIONS, HE BLENDS THEM IN A FORMULA THAT EVEN
24	HE COULDN'T EXPLAIN TO US, AND HE CLAIMED HERE, RIGHT IN FRONT
25	OF YOUR HONOR, THAT EVEN IF BOTH INPUTS WERE WRONG AND

1	INCORRECT, THE OUTPUT WAS JUST FINE.
2	LET'S CONSIDER HIS INPUTS.
3	APPROVED CONTRIBUTIONS DON'T MEASURE VALUE OF ANYTHING, AS
4	MR. CASACCIA EXPLAINED IN GREAT DETAIL. THE HARD WORK IN
5	STANDARD SETTING HAPPENS, YOUR HONOR, IN THE SUBSTANTIVE WORK
6	PHASE. THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED THERE ARE ACTUAL INVENTIONS.
7	THAT'S WHERE THE VALUE IS.
8	ONCE THE SPECIFICATION IS STABLE, THOSE DOCUMENTS ARE PUT
9	AWAY, IN MR. CASACCIA'S WORDS. THEY'RE GONE. AND WE'RE
10	LOOKING AT APPROVED T DOCS WHICH CAN BE ANYTHING FROM CHANGING
11	A HYPHEN OR A PERIOD TO CHANGING AN EDITORIAL COMMENT TO MAKING
12	A MINOR REVISION. THAT'S WHAT IS BEING, QUOTE, "COUNTED" IN
13	APPROVED DOCS. NOBODY BELIEVES THAT CREATES VALUE AND IT
14	IGNORES THE KEY DOCUMENTS THAT CREATED THE INVENTIONS IN THE
15	FIRST PLACE.
16	WHAT'S HIS OTHER INPUT? PATENT COUNTING.
17	WELL, EVEN MR. DONALDSON ADMITTED THAT NOT ALL PATENTS ARE
18	CREATED EQUAL, AND A SINGLE PATENT CAN DOMINATE AN INDUSTRY,
19	AND THAT'S WHAT MR. LASINSKI AGREED TO AS WELL.
20	AND MR. LASINSKI GAVE ABSOLUTELY NO WEIGHT, NONE, ZERO, TO
21	QUALCOMM'S PORTFOLIO OF NON-STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS, WHICH
22	IS VERY, VERY SIGNIFICANT.
23	AND HIS TOP-DOWN APPROACH IS SIMPLY, "I PICKED OUT A
24	STATEMENT MADE BY INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES WITH AN ARBITRARY
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CAP, AN ARBITRARY CAP ON ALL ROYALTIES, AND I WENT FROM THERE."

1	WELL, THAT'S BEEN REJECTED BY COURTS. IT'S BEEN REJECTED
2	BY ETSI. THERE'S NO EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR IT.
3	BUT THAT'S THE WAY HE ARRIVES AT WHAT HE SAYS IS A
4	SUPRA-FRAND ROYALTY. IT'S ABSOLUTE NONSENSE.
5	AND THEIR ONLY ANSWER TO THIS THAT I HEARD WAS AVANCI.
6	AVANCI.
7	WELL, YOU KNOW FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. GONELL THAT
8	AVANCI IS AN EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM THAT DOESN'T AFFECT HANDSETS,
9	THAT COVERS SMART METERS AND AUTOMOTIVE USE, AND THAT QUALCOMM
10	HAS NOT ADOPTED IT IN ANY OTHER AREA OF ITS BUSINESS.
11	NOW, LET'S LOOK AT PROFESSOR SHAPIRO.
12	IT'S NOT JUST, YOUR HONOR, THAT HE HASN'T QUANTIFIED
13	THINGS. IT'S THAT HE IGNORES COMPLETELY WHAT'S OUT THERE IN
14	THE MARKET STARING HIM IN THE FACE.
15	HE'S NOW CONCEDED, AND THEY'VE CONCEDED, THAT HIS
16	SO-CALLED TAX APPLIES WHETHER THE FRAND IS REASONABLE, THE
17	ROYALTY IS REASONABLE OR NOT.
18	WELL, IF THAT'S TRUE, YOU'D HAVE TO MAKE SOME EFFORT TO
19	MEASURE THE THING TO KNOW WHERE THE IMPACT IS COMING FROM
20	BECAUSE IF THE IMPACT IS COMING FROM A LEGITIMATE FRAND
21	ROYALTY, ACCORDING TO SHAPIRO AND WHAT I HEARD MS. MILICI SAY,
22	YOU HAVE THE SAME IMPACT ON CHIP MAKERS.
23	WHAT HAPPENED HERE?
24	HE HASN'T QUANTIFIED THE EFFECTS OF QUALCOMM'S PRACTICES
25	ON ANY OTHER CHIP MAKER.

1	AND REMEMBER, YOUR HONOR, IT'S NOT HIGH PRICES THEY'RE
2	COMPLAINING ABOUT. THEIR THEORY OF HARM IS THAT THE CHIP
3	MAKERS WERE HARMED THROUGH THE TAX THEORY.
4	SO IF YOU HAVEN'T QUANTIFIED THE EFFECTS OF QUALCOMM'S
5	BUSINESS PRACTICES ON THE CHIP MAKERS, YOU HAVEN'T EVEN STARTED
6	THE EVALUATION.
7	HE DID NOTHING TO ANALYZE WHETHER RIVALS' R&D SPENDING AND
8	RESEARCH WERE UP, DOWN, OR SIDEWAYS. AND MY POINT IS THIS IS
9	NOTHING MORE THAN A THEORY.
10	FURTHERMORE, HE JUST ASSUMES THERE'S AN OVERCHARGE WITHOUT
11	HAVING MADE ANY EFFORT TO QUANTIFY IT.
12	WELL, IF THE IF THE FRAND ROYALTY IS A TAX, TOO, THEN
13	YOU'VE GOT TO FIGURE OUT WHAT AMOUNT OF THAT, WHAT AMOUNT OF
14	THE ROYALTY IS ACTUALLY AN OVERCHARGE?
15	HE MADE NO EFFORT TO DO THAT OR TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS OF
16	CONDUCT ON HANDSET PRICES.
17	YOU CANNOT ESTABLISH ACTUAL HARM UNDER THE LAW WITH A
18	THEORY OF HARM THAT IGNORES WHAT HAPPENED IN THE MARKET.
19	THE ONLY PERSON TO DO THE KIND OF EMPIRICAL WORK THAT IS
20	NECESSARY ON MARKET PARTICIPANTS WAS PROFESSOR SNYDER. HE USED
21	INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION TECHNIQUES, HE DISCERNED THAT
22	INVESTMENT, EXECUTION AND FORESIGHT ARE THE FACTORS IMPORTANT
23	TO THIS INDUSTRY, AND HE LOOKED AT THAT AND APPLIED IT ACROSS
24	ALL OF THE COMPETITORS AND TESTIFIED THAT IN EVERY CASE,
25	INDEPENDENT FACTORS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH QUALCOMM,

Τ	EXPLAINED OUTCOMES.
2	AND NO ONE ON THE FTC SIDE HAS EVEN LOOKED AT THIS ISSUE
3	WHERE THEIR MAIN CLAIM IS HARM TO CHIP MAKERS.
4	NOW, LET'S PUT ASIDE THAT PROFESSOR SHAPIRO DIDN'T
5	ACTUALLY DO THE WORK.
6	EVEN HIS THEORY WAS UNABLE TO PREDICT WHAT'S HAPPENED IN
7	THE MARKET. HE PREDICTED THAT THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF MONOPOLY
8	POWER, QUALCOMM'S MARKET SHARE WOULD RISE AND INTEL'S WOULD
9	FALL.
LO	WELL, WE KNOW THAT THE OPPOSITE HAS OCCURRED. QUALCOMM'S
L1	MARKET SHARE IS FALLING AND INTEL'S IS RISING.
L2	HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT PRICES WOULD RISE AND OUTPUT WOULD
L3	FALL.
L 4	AGAIN, THE OPPOSITE'S HAPPENED. PRICES HAVE FALLEN AND
L5	OUTPUT HAS SOARED.
L 6	HE HASN'T BEEN ABLE TO PREDICT WHAT HAPPENED. HIS THEORY
L7	IS SIMPLY DIVORCED FROM WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE REAL WORLD.
L8	ANOTHER KEY FLAW IS THAT HE ASSUMES SOME SORT OF A
L 9	NEGOTIATION BETWEEN QUALCOMM, CHIP MAKERS, AND OEM'S THAT NEVER
20	TAKES PLACE. LICENSE AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED FOR A PERIOD OF
21	YEARS AND CHIP PRICES, THEY'RE NEGOTIATED OVER A PERIOD OF
22	MONTHS.
23	THE ROYALTY THAT QUALCOMM SEEKS FOR ITS I.P. IS CHIP
24	AGNOSTIC. EVERYBODY PAYS THE SAME AMOUNT. IT'S TRANSPARENT.
25	AND THEN THE OEM'S HAVE A CHOICE. THEY CAN BUY A QUALCOMM

1 CHIP OR A COMPETITOR CHIP. AND AS MR. MADDEROM FROM MOTOROLA SAYS, WE DON'T LOOK AT THE ROYALTY. WE LOOK AT THE CHIP PRICE, 2 3 THE AVAILABILITY, AND THE PERFORMANCE, WHICH IS WHAT YOU'D 4 EXPECT. 5 AND PROFESSOR NEVO STUDIED WHAT'S GOING ON IN THIS MARKET 6 AND HOW IT PLAYS OUT, AND, AGAIN, SINCE THE ROYALTY IS CHIP 7 AGNOSTIC, IT DOESN'T AFFECT PURCHASE DECISIONS ON CHIPS. 8 SIMILARLY, THEY MAKE A BIG DEAL OUT OF THE FACT THAT CHIP 9 MAKERS DON'T HAVE EXHAUSTIVE LICENSES FROM QUALCOMM. 10 THAT HASN'T MADE ANY DIFFERENCE AT ALL. SAMSUNG, HUAWEI, 11 SPREADTRUM, MEDIATEK, THEY'RE ALL DOING WELL. THEY'RE THRIVING 12 WITHOUT ANY LICENSE AT ALL FROM QUALCOMM. 13 AND HERE WAS TESTIMONY FROM MR. MOYNIHAN. THEY DID IT ONE 14 TIME, MEDIATEK HAD A NON-EXHAUSTIVE, NON-ASSERTION AGREEMENT. 15 THEY CAME TO QUALCOMM, THEY SAID, WE'RE WORRIED YOU MAY SUE US, 16 SO QUALCOMM ENTERED INTO A NON-EXHAUSTIVE AGREEMENT. WHAT 17 MOYNIHAN SAID WAS IT DIDN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. ONCE IT 18 EXPIRED, OUR BUSINESS DIDN'T CHANGE. WE DIDN'T DO BETTER WITH 19 IT THAN WE DID WITHOUT IT. 20 AND, AGAIN, THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN ANY EVIDENCE THAT THIS 2.1 MATTERS TO ANYONE. 22 DRAGONFLY, VERY BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR, MR. ABERLE TESTIFIED 23 ABOUT THIS. AT THE TRANSCRIPT AT PAGES 302 AND 303, HE WAS TOLD BY DRAGONFLY THAT THEY COULDN'T AGREE AMONGST THEMSELVES 2.4

ON HOW TO SET UP THE GROUP OR WHAT TERMS WERE GOING TO BE.

1	THEY ABANDON THE NEGOTIATION WITH QUALCOMM, NOT THE OTHER WAY
2	AROUND.
3	THE TESTIMONY THAT MS. MILICI CITED FROM MR. HONG WAS THAT
4	HE WASN'T SURE WHAT THE REASONS WERE, AND HE WASN'T INVOLVED
5	DIRECTLY.
6	MR. ABERLE TESTIFIED THAT HE SPOKE TO THE DRAGONFLY PEOPLE
7	AND THAT WAS IT.
8	NOW, EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS OVERWHELMING THAT RIVAL CHIP
9	MAKERS EXPERIENCED A WIDE RANGE OF RESULTS BASED ON FACTORS
LO	THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH QUALCOMM'S LICENSING PRACTICES.
L1	HERE'S MR. ZANDER, WHICH YOU SAW ON VIDEO LAST WEEK. WHAT
L2	HAPPENED AT ST-ERICSSON? LACK OF PROCESS, ORGANIZATIONAL
L3	STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT TEAM, DECISION MAKING.
L 4	HE'S TALKING ABOUT HIS OWN COMPANY HERE.
L5	THEY FAILED ON EXECUTION.
L 6	THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING THAT QUALCOMM DID.
L7	INTEL'S TO THE SAME EFFECT. INTEL AND BAIN TOGETHER PUT
L 8	THIS SLIDE DECK TOGETHER THAT YOUR HONOR SAW FRIDAY WITH
L 9	MR. JOHNSON, AND THEY CONCLUDED THAT ALTHOUGH INTEL WAS
20	SPENDING JUST AS MUCH MONEY AS QUALCOMM, THEIR OUTPUT WAS
21	LOUSY, LESS THAN A THIRD OF WHAT QUALCOMM GENERATED. AND THAT
22	THEY WERE BEHIND NOT BECAUSE OF ANYTHING QUALCOMM DID, BUT
23	BECAUSE THEY MADE A DECISION TO SUPPORT MULTIPLE ARCHITECTURES.
24	THAT'S WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE REAL WORLD. THERE IS
25	SIMPLY NO EVIDENCE FROM ANY MARKET PARTICIPANT OF ANY HARM TO

1	COMPETITION.
2	NOW, LET'S TALK ABOUT THREATS.
3	THE FTC PRESENTED A HANDFUL OF WITNESSES AND E-MAILS TO
4	SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT QUALCOMM THREATENED CHIP SUPPLY TO
5	COERCE HIGH ROYALTIES.
6	EVERY ONE OF THESE LICENSEES, HUAWEI, SONY, LENOVO,
7	SAMSUNG, THEY'RE ALL BIG, SOPHISTICATED COMPANIES WITH THEIR
8	OWN LEVERAGE. EVERYONE WAS A BIG CUSTOMER OF QUALCOMM.
9	ALL THE WITNESSES YOU SAW, YOUR HONOR, WERE LAWYERS. NOT
10	EVERY ONE, BUT MOST OF THEM. GRUBBS, YU, BLUMBERG, THEY WERE
11	LAWYERS, AND THEIR TESTIMONY WAS, OH, YEAH, WE FELT THREATENED
12	AND WE HAD TO DO WHAT WE DID.
13	I WILL SAY THAT THIS TESTIMONY WAS PRESENTED TO THIS COURT
14	IN A VERY MISLEADING FASHION. THE FTC INSISTED THAT WE SAVE
15	OUR RESPONSES FOR OUR OWN CASE.
16	SO, FOR EXAMPLE, MR. GRUBBS TESTIFIED FOR 25 MINUTES ON
17	VIDEO. "I FELT LIKE I HAD TO DO IT, I WAS DESPERATE FOR CHIPS,
18	I WAS WORRIED THAT IF I COMPLAINED, MY CHIP SUPPLY WOULD BE CUT
19	OFF."
20	AND THEN, YOUR HONOR, THERE WAS THIS A WEEK LATER WHEN WE
21	GOT TO OUR CASE.
22	(THE VIDEOTAPED OF JOHN GRUBBS WAS PLAYED IN OPEN COURT
23	OFF THE RECORD.)
24	MR. VAN NEST: YOUR HONOR, TO THE SAME EFFECT WAS
25	MR. BLUMBERG FROM LENOVO. THE MR. BLUMBERG CAME IN AND SAID HE

1	WAS THREATENED BY MR. REIFSCHNEIDER, THAT HE WAS FEARFUL FOR
2	HIS CHIP SUPPLY.
3	HE COULDN'T IDENTIFY WHERE THE CHIPS CAME FROM, WHAT CHIPS
4	HE NEEDED OR WHAT CHIPS THEY WERE BUYING.
5	HE'S ALSO A LAWYER. WE LISTENED TO HIM FOR AN HOUR.
6	AND THEN DURING OUR CASE, WE PLAYED THE TESTIMONY FROM
7	MR. MADDEROM WHO WAS ACTUALLY IN THE MEETING WHERE HIS BOSS
8	COMPLAINED TO QUALCOMM ABOUT CHIP SUPPLY, AND HERE'S WHAT HE
9	SAID.
10	(THE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF TODD MADDEROM WAS PLAYED IN
11	OPEN COURT OFF THE RECORD.)
12	MR. VAN NEST: YOUR HONOR, WITNESS AFTER WITNESS
13	PRESENTED BY THE FTC CONCEDED WHAT'S ON THIS NEXT SLIDE: THAT
14	QUALCOMM NEVER STOPPED SUPPLYING CHIPS DURING A LICENSING
15	NEGOTIATION WHEN THERE WERE COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES; THAT IN MANY
16	CASES, PEOPLE WHO FTC CLAIMED WERE THREATENED SAID NO. MR. LEE
17	IS TALKING ABOUT A NEGOTIATION HE HAD. MS. YANG FROM PEGATRON
18	IS TALKING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS SHE HAD.
19	THEIR BIG EMPHASIS WAS ON SONY.
20	WELL, YOUR HONOR HAS HEARD THE SONY STORY, AND I'LL POINT
21	OUT THAT THERE WAS A PRODUCT HOLD. BUT MR. MOLLENKOPF
22	TESTIFIED THAT WITHIN HOURS OF THAT, HE REVERSED IT AND HE
23	COMMUNICATED IMMEDIATELY TO SONY THAT THIS IS NOT GOING TO
24	HAPPEN, I'M SORRY THAT IT HAPPENED, MY TEAM IS REVERSING IT.

AND YOU HEARD NO TESTIMONY FROM ANYONE WHATSOEVER FROM

1	ANYONE FROM SONY, NOT ON VIDEO, NOT IN COURT. NO ONE FROM SONY
2	CAME TO BACK THIS UP. THIS IS ALL SOMETHING THAT THE FTC HAS
3	PUT TOGETHER WITH SNIPPETS FROM THIS E-MAIL AND THAT.
4	BUT THE TESTIMONY IS CRYSTAL CLEAR AND THE DOCUMENTS AND
5	THE E-MAILS BACK IT UP 100 PERCENT.
6	ANOTHER POINT IS THAT WHENEVER A LICENSEE ASKED FOR
7	ASSURANCE, THEY GOT IT. MR. MADDEROM TESTIFIED THAT THEY ASKED
8	AND GOT ON ASSURANCE.
9	MR. WILLIAMS SAID THEY HAD A CONTRACT ASSURANCE.
10	MR. LEE FROM SAMSUNG SAID THEY ASKED FOR IT AND IT WAS
11	GIVEN.
12	TIME AND TIME AGAIN, THE FOLKS IN THESE LICENSE
13	NEGOTIATIONS CONFIRM WHAT I'VE BEEN SAYING, THAT CHIP SUPPLIES
14	FOR COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS WERE NEVER CUT OFF AND THESE THREATS
15	ARE HIGHLY EXAGGERATED WHEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT LAWYERS.
16	NOW, THIS NEXT SLIDE SHOWS THAT THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO
17	EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTCOMES OF ANY OF THESE WOULD HAVE BEEN
18	DIFFERENT. THEY PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT ANY OF
19	THESE OUTCOMES WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IN THE REAL WORLD.
20	AND TAKE A LOOK, YOUR HONOR. WE'VE GOT THE TRIAL CITES
21	AND THE EXHIBIT CITES. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED IN THESE IS NOW
22	IN THE RECORD.
23	SO SONY, FOR EXAMPLE, NEGOTIATED FOR TEN MORE MONTHS AFTER
24	THE EVIDENCE YOU SAW. THERE WAS NO DISRUPTION, THEY AGREED ON
25	RATES AND A THREE YEAR TERM.

1	AND EVEN THOUGH THE AGREEMENT EXPIRED IN THE INTERIM,
2	SUPPLY CONTINUED.
3	HUAWEI'S TO THE SAME EFFECT. THEY NEGOTIATED ON AN LTE
4	LICENSE FOR TWO YEARS AND WON AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR A NEW
5	AGREEMENT IF THE PARTIES DIDN'T RENEW. BY THEN THEY WERE
6	PRODUCING THEIR OWN CHIPS ANYWAY.
7	SAMSUNG NEGOTIATED FOR TWO YEARS AND GOT A LOWER ROYALTY
8	RATE.
9	LENOVO TO THE SAME EFFECT.
10	MOST OF THESE EXAMPLES THEY PRESENTED ARE OLD. I NOTICED
11	ONE IN THE CLOSING OF THE FTC FROM 2001, A SAMSUNG EXAMPLE.
12	2001. NOBODY IS CLAIMING THAT QUALCOMM HAD ANY MARKET POWER
13	THEN, AND THAT NEGOTIATION HAPPENED BECAUSE SAMSUNG STOPPED
14	PAYING ROYALTIES AT ALL AND THEY REALIZED THEY WERE WRONG AND
15	PAID UP.
16	NOW, I WANT TO MAKE A KEY POINT HERE, YOUR HONOR, WHICH IS
17	HIGH ROYALTIES ALONE IS NOT THE BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIM OF HARM
18	BECAUSE HIGH ROYALTIES ALONE ARE NOT ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OR
19	ANTITRUST INJURY.
20	THEY HAVE TO SHOW HARM TO COMPETITION, AND WHAT THEY'VE
21	CHOSEN TO TRY TO PROVE IS HARM TO THE RIVAL CHIP MAKERS.
22	THAT'S WHY THEY'RE PRESENTING THIS TAX THEORY FROM
23	SHAPIRO.
24	SO EVEN IF YOUR HONOR WERE TO FIND THAT LASINSKI IS
25	CREDIBLE, WHICH I DON'T THINK YOU COULD, AND EVEN IF YOU WERE

1	TO FIND THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS RESULTED IN HIGHER ROYALTIES,
2	THAT'S NOT THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT THEY'RE TRYING TO PROVE.
3	THEY'RE TRYING TO PROVE THIS TAX THEORY, AND THAT'S WHY
4	THIS IS IMPORTANT, WHAT WE TALKED ABOUT WITH PROFESSOR SHAPIRO.
5	THEY'RE SAYING THAT THERE WAS A SUPRA-FRAND TAX THAT HE
6	PREDICTS WOULD RAISE RIVALS' COST THOSE ARE CHIP MAKERS
7	HE PREDICTS WOULD REDUCE RIVALS' INCOME, HE PREDICTS WOULD
8	REDUCE RIVALS' SPENDING IN R&D, HE PREDICTS WOULD CAUSE HARM.
9	THE PROBLEM FOR HIM IS THAT THE TIME FOR THEORIES AND
LO	PREDICTIONS IS PRETRIAL, NOT TRIAL. YOU HAVE TO PROVE IT. YOU
L1	HAVE TO HAVE EVIDENCE.
L2	HE ADMITTED NOT LOOKING AT ANY ONE OF THESE FACTORS, YOUR
L3	HONOR, FOR ANY PARTICIPANT IN THIS MARKET.
L 4	I DIDN'T LOOK AT ANYONE'S ACTUAL COST AND ANYONE'S ACTUAL
L5	INCOME.
L 6	AND YOUR HONOR KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED WITH RIVALS' R&D.
L7	INTEL HAD PLENTY OF MONEY, BUT THE RESEARCH EFFORTS WERE
L 8	FUTILE.
L 9	ST-ERICSSON HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH MONEY, BUT THEIR RESEARCH
20	EFFORTS WERE BUNGLED.
21	BROADCOM HAD PLENTY OF MONEY, BUT THEY CHOSE TO LEAVE AN
22	INTENSELY COMPETITIVE MARKET.
23	MY POINT ON PROFESSOR SHAPIRO IS YOU DON'T GET PAST THE
24	BURDEN BY JUST TELLING ME WHAT YOUR THEORY IS, AND HE
25	REPEATEDLY TREATED US LIKE IDIOTS BECAUSE WE COULDN'T

1	UNDERSTAND THAT.
2	NOW, I HEARD SOMETHING ABOUT STRAT FUNDS, WHICH MS. MILICI
3	REFERRED TO AS A CHIP DISCOUNT.
4	THEIR THEORY OF HARM FROM STRAT FUNDS IS BAFFLING. THESE
5	ARE MONIES, EVEN THEIR UNDER THEORY, PAID FROM QUALCOMM BACK TO
6	LICENSEES.
7	IF QUALCOMM HAS THE MARKET POWER TO DEMAND A SUPRA-FRAND
8	ROYALTY, WHY IN THE WORLD WOULD THEY SPEND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
9	ON STRAT FUNDS?
10	NOW, MR. ABERLE EXPLAINED THESE AT PAGE 297 OF THE
11	TRANSCRIPT, YOUR HONOR. I'M SORRY, I DON'T HAVE A SLIDE ON IT.
12	BUT WHAT HE SAID WAS WE CONTRIBUTE TO A STRAT FUND AND THE
13	LICENSEE CONTRIBUTES, AND WE DO DEVELOPMENT WORK TOGETHER TO
14	PROMOTE OUR TECHNOLOGY AND THEIR PRODUCTS.
15	NOW, THEIR THEORY IS THAT THESE STRAT FUNDS ARE ONLY USED
16	WITH RECALCITRANT LICENSEES WHO WEREN'T DEPENDENT ON QUALCOMM.
17	THAT'S BALONEY. PROFESSOR NEVO LOOKED AT THOSE STRAT
18	FUNDS THAT WERE NEGOTIATED, ALONG WITH LICENSING AGREEMENTS,
19	AND THEY'RE ALL GIVEN TO PEOPLE WHO ARE BUYING MOST OR ALL OF
20	THEIR CHIPS FROM QUALCOMM.
21	SUGGESTING THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE USING THEIR OWN LEVERAGE
22	TO SAY, HEY, I'M A HUGE CUSTOMER, YOU BETTER TAKE CARE OF ME
23	AND HELP ME OR I'M NOT GOING TO BUY YOUR CHIPS ANYMORE.
24	PROFESSOR NEVO DISCUSSED THIS TEST AT TRANSCRIPT PAGE
25	1907.

Τ	LET'S TALK ABOUT APPLE BRIEFLY.
2	THIS IS A SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT CLAIM, YOUR HONOR, ASIDE
3	FROM THE WHOLE TAX THEORY. THEY'RE CLAIMING THIS CAUSED HARM
4	BY EXCLUDING PEOPLE.
5	BUT LET'S BE CLEAR. PROFESSOR SHAPIRO IS ONLY TALKING
6	ABOUT INTEL, AND HE'S ONLY TALKING ABOUT A ONE YEAR DELAY, AND
7	HE'S ONLY TALKING ABOUT THIS ONE CONTRACT, AND HE'S NOT TALKING
8	ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE.
9	AND WE NOW KNOW, JUST LIKE MR. MOLLENKOPF SAID, THIS WHOLE
LO	TRANSACTION WAS INITIATED BY APPLE.
L1	MR. WILLIAMS SAID THE OTHER PIECE IS WE WERE GOING TO MOVE
L2	OUR BUSINESS FROM INFINEON TO QUALCOMM BECAUSE WE NEEDED
L3	QUALCOMM TECHNOLOGY. WE ASKED FOR TRANSITION FUNDS.
L 4	THIS IS COMING FROM APPLE. THEY WERE DEMANDING BIG
L5	UPFRONT PAYMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR MOVING THE BUSINESS, AND THEY
L 6	GOT THAT.
L7	BUT ALONG WITH IT, THEY HAD TO MAKE A COMMITMENT THAT IF
L8	THEY DIDN'T BUY CHIPS, THEY WOULDN'T GET THE MONEY.
L 9	AND THAT'S WHAT MR. WILLIAMS CALLED IT. THIS IS
20	ABSOLUTELY CONSISTENT WITH WHAT MR. MOLLENKOPF SAID. THE
21	TRANSITION AGREEMENT ALLOWED QUALCOMM TO PROTECT ITSELF FROM
22	MAKING THESE LARGE INCENTIVE PAYMENTS IF APPLE DIDN'T BUY
23	CHIPS.
24	THAT'S RIGHT.
25	THE FUNDS WERE A PRICE VOLUME REBATE THAT'S A STANDARD

1 PRACTICE.

2.1

2.4

REMEMBER, YOUR HONOR, WE'RE CALLING THIS AN EXCLUSIVE

DEAL. BUT IN REALITY, THERE WAS NO MINIMUM GUARANTEED PURCHASE

FROM QUALCOMM. THEY DIDN'T HAVE TO BUY A SINGLE CHIP. AND

THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO SELECT A SECOND SOURCE, AND THEY DID,

INTEL IN 2016.

NOW, THE IDEA THAT THIS WAS SOMEHOW EXCLUSIONARY,

MR. MOLLENKOPF TESTIFIED, AND IT'S PRETTY OBVIOUS FROM

MR. WILLIAMS, IT'S A WINNER TAKE ALL DEAL, AND IF IT'S A WINNER

TAKE ALL DEAL, THERE'S GOING TO BE ONE WINNER AND ONE LOSER,

AND QUALCOMM WANTED TO BE THE WINNER. THAT'S WHY THEY BID ON

IT, AND THAT'S WHY MR. MOLLENKOPF TOOK THIS NEXT SLIDE TO THE

BOARD.

THIS ONE IS UNDER SEAL, YOUR HONOR. IT'S JX 86.

TAKE A LOOK. THIS IS WHAT HE WAS PREDICTING UNDER THIS

DEAL. ON THE TOP, THAT'S MAVERICK DEAL. ON THE BOTTOM, THAT'S

NO DEAL. THERE'S A HUGE DIFFERENCE IN UNITS AND A HUGE

DIFFERENCE IN DOLLARS. BUT IT'S ALL PROFITABLE. THIS WAS NOT

A LOSS LEADER. THIS WAS NOT SOME SORT OF A SUNKEN FUND. THIS

WAS NOT ANYTHING LIKE WHAT THE FTC OR PROFESSOR SHAPIRO CLAIMS.

THIS WAS A STRAIGHT-UP PROFIT DEAL WITH A LOT OF OPPORTUNITY FOR QUALCOMM, AND THEY MADE PROFIT, AND LOTS OF IT ACCORDING TO MR. MOLLENKOPF.

NOW, THERE'S ANOTHER REASON WHY THIS IS ALL MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, AND THAT IS EVEN THE ONE YEAR PERIOD THAT SHAPIRO

1	CLAIMS WAS A PERIOD OF DELAY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
2	BECAUSE INTEL WASN'T READY TO PROVIDE A PRODUCT UNTIL 2016, AS
3	THIS SLIDE SHOWS.
4	HERE'S MR. SAUER, WHOM WE CALLED FROM APPLE. HE WAS
5	RUNNING THE PROJECT FROM THE APPLE SIDE. INTEL WAS STRUGGLING
6	TO MATCH QUALCOMM IN 2015. THEY WEREN'T ABLE TO DO IT. THEY
7	DIDN'T HAVE WHAT APPLE WANTED ON THE SCHEDULE APPLE WANTED,
8	WHICH IS WHY APPLE STAYED WITH QUALCOMM.
9	SO THERE IS NOTHING WHATSOEVER EXCLUSIONARY ABOUT THESE
LO	SERIES OF TRANSACTIONS BECAUSE THERE WAS NOBODY ELSE TO DO IT.
L1	AND GUESS WHAT? INTEL GOT THE BUSINESS IN 2016, BUT
L2	THAT'S ALL THEY EVER WANTED. AS MS. EVANS SAYS, THEY DON'T
L3	HAVE A PROGRAM TO BE IN HANDSETS MORE BROADLY. YOU'VE GOT TO
L 4	BE MAKING SYSTEM ON A CHIP TO BE A REAL COMPETITOR, AS
L5	MS. CHIPTY'S CHART ON THE RIGHT SHOWS.
L 6	THEY'RE NOT THERE. THEY'RE NOT EVEN INTERESTED IN IT.
L7	SO THE ONE YEAR DELAY WAS NO DELAY AT ALL. THEY GOT THE
L8	BUSINESS THEY WANTED. THEY NOW HAVE THE BUSINESS THEY WANT.
L9	AND THE FTC HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO SHOW WHAT PORTION OF ANY
20	MARKET WAS FORECLOSED BY THIS SINGLE TRANSACTION.
21	SO THERE'S BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO SHOWING UNDER THE TAX
22	THEORY, UNDER THIS THEORY, OR ANY OTHER THEORY, THAT THERE'S
23	BEEN ANY HARM TO COMPETITION.
24	AND, YOUR HONOR, UNDER THE LAW, THAT'S WHERE THE ANALYSIS
25	STOPS. YOU DON'T EVEN GET TO PROCOMPETITIVE REASONS OR ANY OF

1	THE REST OF IT. THEY'VE GOT TO SHOW BURDEN THEY'VE GOT TO
2	SHOW HARM TO COMPETITION.
3	BUT LET ME TALK ABOUT QUALCOMM'S LICENSING PRACTICES
4	BECAUSE THAT'S THEIR OTHER BEEF.
5	YOUR HONOR, LICENSING AT THE HANDSET LEVEL IS INDUSTRY
6	STANDARD AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO THE DUTY TO
7	DEAL THAT WE TALKED ABOUT PRETRIAL.
8	EVERY ONE OF THESE WITNESSES AND I GOT SIX ON THE
9	CHART INCLUDING MR. DONALDSON FROM THE FTC, MR. MOYNIHAN
10	FROM MEDIATEK, MR. WEILER FROM ETSI, PETERSSON, MCELVAINE, AND
11	RAHNASTO FROM NOKIA, INTERDIGITAL, ERICSSON, THEY ALL SAID THE
12	SAME THING. WE LICENSE AT THE HANDSET LEVEL BECAUSE IT'S MORE
13	EFFICIENT, YOU HAVE A SINGLE TRANSACTION, EVERYBODY IS
14	PROTECTED, AND THE VALUE OF OUR PATENTS IS PRACTICED AT THE
15	HANDSET.
16	NOW, THERE'S A COROLLARY TO THAT. IT'S THE OTHER SIDE OF
17	THE SAME COIN. IF YOU LICENSE AT THE HANDSET LEVEL, YOU DON'T
18	LICENSE AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL, AND THE WITNESSES ALL SAID
19	THAT, TOO.
20	MR. MOYNIHAN SAID, IPR HOLDERS GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO MAKE
21	IT CLEAR THEY'RE NOT LICENSING THE CHIPSET COMPANY.
22	INTERDIGITAL DOES NOT ENTER INTO STANDALONE PATENT LICENSE
23	AGREEMENTS.
24	PETERSSON, ST-ERICSSON COULD RELY ON THE INDUSTRY PRACTICE
25	AND WAS NEVER APPROACHED BY THE PATENT HOLDERS.

1 THE COROLLARY IS THAT CHIPSET LEVEL LICENSING IS NOT 2 CUSTOMARY. 3 AND BY THE WAY, THE FTC DIDN'T INTRODUCE A SINGLE CHIP 4 LEVEL LICENSE IN THIS CASE TO BACK UP ITS CLAIM THAT QUALCOMM 5 IS SOMEHOW OUT OF THE MAIN STREAM. THEY'RE NOT. 6 THESE WITNESSES ALL EXPLAINED WHY HANDSET LEVEL LICENSING 7 IS IMPORTANT AND WHY OUALCOMM'S PRACTICES ARE IN LINE. THEY 8 ALL EXPLAIN THAT WHY WOULD YOU WANT TO HAVE TEN NEGOTIATIONS 9 WITH EACH OF THE COMPONENT SUPPLIERS IF YOU CAN HAVE ONE WITH 10 THE DEVICE LEVEL OEM AND COVER EVERYBODY? THAT'S WHAT EVERYONE 11 HAS DONE. THAT'S BEEN INDUSTRY PRACTICE FOR YEARS. WE'RE NOT 12 AN OUTLIER IN ANY RESPECT. 13 AND YOU HEARD FROM ETSI, YOUR HONOR. MR. WEILER CAME IN 14 AND TESTIFIED THAT ETSI CONSIDERS HANDSET LEVEL LICENSING 15 CONSISTENT WITH INDUSTRY PRACTICE AND FULLY IN LINE WITH THE 16 POLICY OBJECTIVES. 17 NOW, MR. ROGERS, AND MR. GONELL, AND MR. WEILER TESTIFIED 18 THAT ETSI POLICY IS THE POLICY THAT PEOPLE IN 3GPP, WHICH IS 19 THE CELLULAR STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, LOOK TO FOR IPR POLICY. 20 NO ONE MAKING A FRAND COMMITMENT IN THE PAST, YOUR HONOR, 2.1 HAS CONSIDERED IT THEIR OBLIGATION TO LICENSE A CHIP MAKER. 22 THAT'S NOT BEEN THE WAY PEOPLE HAVE BEHAVED IN THE INDUSTRY. 23 IT'S NOT BEEN THE WAY THE INDUSTRY HAS OPERATED. THE WAY THE INDUSTRY HAS OPERATED IS THE WAY QUALCOMM HAS 2.4 25 OPERATED, HANDSET LEVEL LICENSING.

1	AS MR. GONELL HAS SAID, QUALCOMM HAS NEVER GRANTED AN
2	EXHAUSTIVE LICENSE TO A CHIP MAKER. IT'S NOT A SITUATION WHERE
3	QUALCOMM HAD A PRACTICE THAT CHANGED OR QUALCOMM MADE A
4	COMMITMENT THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD REQUIRED LICENSING AT THE
5	COMPONENT LEVEL.
6	GOOD REASONS EXIST FOR DOING IT THE WAY THEY DO, AND
7	THAT'S THE WAY THEY'VE ALWAYS DONE IT.
8	SO YOU COULDN'T FIND ANTICOMPETITIVE MALICE FROM THIS IF
9	IT'S WHAT THE INDUSTRY DOES, AND THERE'S TESTIMONY THAT IT'S
10	ABSOLUTELY CONSISTENT WITH ETSI.
11	I UNDERSTAND THE FUTURE MAY BE DIFFERENT, MAY BE. BUT THE
12	PAST IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THIS IS HOW FOLKS HAVE OPERATED.
13	AND, YOUR HONOR, THE ONLY THING I HEARD TO COUNTER THIS
14	WAS CROSS-LICENSING, CROSS-LICENSING.
15	YOU HEARD ABOUT CROSS-LICENSING FROM MR. GONELL AND
16	MR. WEILER, TOO. CROSS-LICENSING IS ABSOLUTELY INDUSTRY
17	STANDARD, BUT IT'S FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM COMPONENT LEVEL
18	LICENSING.
19	IF YOU ARE GIVING A PORTFOLIO LICENSE TO A LICENSEE, IT
20	MAKES NO SENSE NOT TO HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.
21	OTHERWISE YOU SIGN YOUR LICENSE WITH THE LICENSEE, YOU GIVE
22	THEM YOUR RIGHTS TO ALL YOUR PATENTS, AND THE NEXT DAY THEY SUE
23	YOU ON THEIR PORTFOLIO.
24	THAT MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO SENSE AND NOBODY OPERATES THAT
25	WAY.

1 MR. GONELL TESTIFIED THAT'S COMMON, AND MR. WEILER SAID THAT'S HOW ETSI OPERATES, TOO. YOU'RE ALLOWED TO, IN A FRAND 2 3 WORLD, YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY ALLOWED TO ASK FOR A CROSS-LICENSE IF 4 YOU'RE PROVIDING A FRAND LICENSE. 5 NOW, THAT MEANS THAT THERE IS NO ANTITRUST DUTY TO DEAL 6 BASED ON THE ROADMAP THAT YOUR HONOR LAID OUT IN THE MOTION TO 7 DISMISS. YOU LAID IT OUT. YOU GAVE THEM A CLEAR ROADMAP, AND 8 IT WAS CORRECT. YOU SAID THERE HAS TO BE A CHANGE OR 9 ABANDONMENT OF A PROFITABLE COURSE OF DEALING, AND 10 ANTICOMPETITIVE MALICE, NAMELY, SOMETHING NOT RATIONAL DONE FOR 11 AN ANTICOMPETITIVE PURPOSE. 12 THERE'S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT HERE. THEY FAILED TO PROVE 13 IT. THEY HAD THE ROADMAP, BUT THEY DIDN'T GET ON THE ROAD. 14 OUR REFUSAL TO LICENSE CHIP MAKERS IS INDUSTRY STANDARD, 15 IT'S NEVER CHANGED, IT'S BEEN CONSISTENT WITH ETSI POLICY 16 THROUGHOUT, AND THERE IS NOW ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS FOR A FINDING 17 OF A DUTY TO DEAL WITH COMPETITORS. 18 NOW, SOMETHING THAT IS NOT INDUSTRY STANDARD IS QUALCOMM'S 19 POLICY OF SELLING ONLY TO LICENSED OEM'S. I THINK IN THAT 20 RESPECT QUALCOMM IS UNIQUE, AND WE SAID THAT RIGHT UPFRONT. 2.1 YOU HEARD TESTIMONY ABOUT THIS FROM MR. MOLLENKOPF, 22 MR. GONELL, MR. NEVO, PROFESSOR NEVO. AND THE ANSWER IS QUALCOMM'S UNIQUE. IT STARTED OFF AS A 23 2.4 LICENSING BUSINESS WITH SYSTEM END-TO-END TECHNOLOGY. IT NEVER

INTENDED TO GET PAID BASED ON PRODUCT SALES. FROM THE VERY

1 BEGINNING, THE VALUE IN ITS I.P. WAS RECOVERED FROM LICENSING. SO IN EFFECT, THEY HAVE TWO BUSINESSES. THERE'S A 2 3 LICENSING BUSINESS WITH THE SYSTEM END-TO-END TECHNOLOGY THAT 4 READS ALL OVER THE HANDSET; AND THERE'S A CHIP BUSINESS. THE 5 I.P. FOR THE SYSTEM IS NOT PRICED INTO THE CHIP. 6 AND QUALCOMM SHOULDN'T BE AT A DISADVANTAGE JUST BECAUSE 7 THEY HAVE A CHIP BUSINESS. IT SHOULDN'T BE THE CASE THAT THEY 8 SHOULD PUT THEMSELVES AT RISK OF SOMEBODY CLAIMING, I DON'T 9 HAVE TO PAY FOR YOUR I.P. BECAUSE I BOUGHT A CHIP. THAT'S NOT 10 BEEN THE WAY THE BUSINESS HAS DEVELOPED. THAT'S NOT BEEN THE 11 WAY QUALCOMM HAS DEALT WITH ITS LICENSEES FOR THE LAST 30 12 YEARS. 13 IT'S ABSOLUTELY FAIR, AS PROFESSOR NEVO SAID, BECAUSE IT'S 14 TRANSPARENT. ALL LICENSEES PAY THE RATE. THEY KNOW THE STATED 15 RATE. THEY NEGOTIATE A DEAL, AND THEN EVERYBODY COMPETES ON 16 THE CHIPS. THERE'S NO OVERLAP BETWEEN THOSE. FOLKS ARE COMPETING ON 17 18 CHIPS. IT DOESN'T MATTER, ONCE YOU HAVE A LICENSE, WHOSE CHIPS 19 YOU BUY. YOU COMPETE ON THE MERITS OF THE CHIPS. 20 PERFORMANCE, PRICE, AVAILABILITY. 21 AND PROFESSOR NEVO SAID THAT'S A FAIR WAY TO DO IT, AND I 22 DIDN'T HEAR ONE WORD FROM PROFESSOR SHAPIRO IN RESPONSE. 23 AND ALL THIS TESTIMONY THAT YOU HEARD ABOUT THE DOCUMENTS 2.4 THAT GOOD OLD BCG PREPARED WAS ABSOLUTELY CONSISTENT WITH THIS. 25 BCG PROVIDED A SLIDE DECK NOT TO MR. MOLLENKOPF AND NOT TO

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MANAGEMENT AND NOT TO MR. JACOBS, THEY PRESENTED IT TO AN INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD.

MR. MOLLENKOPF SAID CLEARLY, THE REASON WE KEPT THE
BUSINESS TOGETHER WAS BECAUSE HAVING A CHIP BUSINESS HELPS US
WITH CREDIBILITY WITH THE STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS, IT HELPS
WITH THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT A STANDARD THAT WE'RE PROPOSING CAN
ACTUALLY BE TURNED INTO A PRODUCT, AND ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE
CHIP BUSINESS IS BETTER OFF BECAUSE WE'VE GOT AN INVENTION
MACHINE OVER HERE IN OUR CORPORATE R&D THAT ALLOWS US TO GET
PRODUCTS TO MARKET SOONER.

THERE ARE ABSOLUTELY GOOD, FAIR, LEGITIMATE REASONS TO KEEP THE BUSINESS TOGETHER, AND THERE'S NOBODY IN MANAGEMENT OR ANYWHERE ELSE AT QUALCOMM THAT SAYS USING STICKS AND CARROTS IS A GREAT THING.

NOW, MY FINAL POINT MAYBE HAS BEEN CONCEDED, AND THAT IS THAT QUALCOMM EARNED ITS PLACE THROUGH SUPERIOR INNOVATION AND BETTER PRODUCTS.

WHY IS THAT IMPORTANT?

THIS QUOTE, YOUR HONOR, IS FROM THE FTC'S PROPOSED

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE GIST OF IT IS THEY'VE GOT THE

BURDEN TO SHOW THAT QUALCOMM MAINTAINED ITS MARKET POSITION

THROUGH ILLEGAL CONDUCT RATHER THAN GROWTH OR DEVELOPMENT AS A

CONSEQUENCE OF A BETTER PRODUCT, BUSINESS ACUMEN, ET CETERA.

WELL, WE HAVE PROVED TO A TEE THAT QUALCOMM GOT HERE AND STAYED HERE BASED ON THE SUCCESS OF ITS ENGINEERING PROGRAM.

1 AND THE EVIDENCE IS ESSENTIALLY UNDISPUTED ON THAT. LET'S LOOK AT WHAT YOU HEARD FROM MR. JACOBS. WE'RE 2 3 LOOKING FOR A WAY TO MAKE A MAJOR STEP AND TAKE A SYSTEMS APPROACH. WE DON'T WANT TO IMPROVE THINGS JUST A LITTLE. WE 4 5 WANT TO IMPROVE THEM A LOT. 6 AND THE FTC NOW ADMITS THAT CDMA IN MOBILE WAS AN 7 INVENTION OF QUALCOMM AND THAT WAS A HUGE STEP FORWARD FOR 8 VOICE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EARLY DAYS. 9 BUT THAT'S NOT THE END OF IT. THAT'S NOT THE END OF IT. 10 YOU HEARD FROM MR. MALLADI AND FROM DR. JACOBS THAT QUALCOMM 11 HAS KEPT PUSHING THE INDUSTRY FORWARD. 12 WHAT WAS THE NEXT BIG THING? HDR, HIGH DATA RATES. 13 THAT'S A BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY. 14 WHY DO WE HAVE CELL PHONES AND SMARTPHONES NOW THAT CAN 15 CARRY ALL THIS DATA AND YOUTUBE AND VIDEO AND EVERYTHING ELSE? 16 IT'S BECAUSE OF HDR. THAT WAS A BREAKTHROUGH THAT'S MADE 17 BILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR THE INDUSTRY, INCLUDING ALL OF OUR OEM 18 LICENSEES. THAT HAS PUSHED THE INDUSTRY FROM 2G TO 3G TO 4G. 19 AND PROFESSOR ANDREWS PUT A FINE POINT ON IT. HE SAID 20 QUALCOMM HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN TWO AREAS, FUNDAMENTAL 2.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAVEFORMS AND CONTROL THAT AFFECTS 22 SMARTPHONE OPERATION. THAT'S WHERE QUALCOMM HAS FOCUSSED ITS 23 WORK. 24 AND BROAD PATENT COVERAGE IN THESE NEW AREAS THAT ARE 25 TAKING US TO 4G AND 5G, CARRIER AGGREGATION, CELLULAR IN

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2.4

1 UNLICENSED SPECTRUM, HETEROGENOUS NETWORKS.

HE TESTIFIED THAT THE PORTFOLIO WAS BROAD AND DEEP AND
THAT THESE WERE ALL FUNDAMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT WHICH THE
INDUSTRY WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD.

AND MR. CHEN FROM QUALCOMM EXPLAINED THAT RESEARCH GIVES US A LOT OF PATENTS, INCLUDING IN THE NON-STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT AREAS THAT READ ALL OVER THE PHONE, AREAS OUTSIDE OF CELLULAR, AREAS THAT ARE NOT CELLULAR, AREAS THAT ARE FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES ON YOUR SMARTPHONE THAT DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH CELLULAR.

NOT ONLY HAS MR. LASINSKI IGNORED THOSE, BUT THE FTC HASN'T PROVEN ANYTHING ABOUT ANY OTHER COMPETING PORTFOLIO, NOTHING. THERE'S NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ABOUT ANYBODY ELSE'S PORTFOLIO.

AND I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOUR HONOR THERE'S A REASON FOR THAT. THE REASON QUALCOMM LEADS IN ROYALTIES, AND THE REASON QUALCOMM'S ROYALTY RATES HAVE REMAINED THE SAME, AND THE REASON THOSE RATES HAVE BEEN THE SAME NO MATTER WHAT THEIR MARKET SHARE IS, IS THIS, IT'S THEIR TECHNOLOGY, THEIR PORTFOLIO.

IT'S SIMPLY BETTER THAN EVERYBODY ELSE'S.

AND NO WITNESS CAME ON THE FTC SIDE TO CONTRADICT THAT.

NOTHING IN THE RECORD.

AND IT'S BACKED UP BY OUR COMPETITORS AND OUR CUSTOMERS,

TOO. HERE'S WHAT BAIN AND INTEL CAME UP WITH. THEY'RE TALKING

NOW NOT ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTAL SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY, BUT OUR CHIP

1	BUSINESS. INTEL RECOGNIZES QUALCOMM R&D DRIVES THE PACE OF
2	INNOVATION.
3	IT'S QUALCOMM THAT'S OUT FRONT BUILDING THE BETTER
4	PRODUCTS.
5	AND YOU MAY REMEMBER, YOUR HONOR, MR. MOYNIHAN FROM
6	MEDIATEK SAID WE BENCHMARK AGAINST QUALCOMM. THEY'RE THE
7	LEADER. THAT'S AT PAGES 325 EXAMINE 326. AGAIN, FORGIVE ME, I
8	DON'T HAVE A SLIDE. BUT IT'S TRANSCRIPT 325 AND 326. MOYNIHAN
9	SAID, FROM MEDIATEK, WE BENCHMARK.
10	THE CUSTOMERS ALL AGREED. THIS TESTIMONY WAS FEATURED BY
11	THEM. QUALCOMM HAD THE BEST CHIPSET AVAILABLE.
12	NOBODY ELSE WAS THERE. QUALCOMM WAS AHEAD IN LTE.
13	QUALCOMM'S PERFORMANCE WAS A YEAR AHEAD OF INTEL. QUALCOMM HAD
14	A SUPERIOR OFFERING.
15	OVER AND OVER.
16	AND NOT ONLY THAT, YOUR HONOR, THIS IS ALL TESTIMONY THAT
17	WAS ELICITED BY THE FTC. PROFESSOR SHAPIRO CHIMED IN AND GAVE
18	US THIS HELPFUL CHART.
19	THIS CHART SHOWS, IN PROFESSOR SHAPIRO'S VIEW, THAT
20	QUALCOMM HAS BEEN FIRST TO MARKET IN EVERY SINGLE ADVANCED LTE
21	TECHNOLOGY CATEGORY. EVERY ONE.
22	THE BOXES ON THE LEFT WITH THE NICE COLORS ARE QUALCOMM,
23	AND THE BOXES ON THE RIGHT ARE THE REST OF THE INDUSTRY TRYING
24	TO CATCH UP.
25	SO CATEGORY 3, THEY'RE TWO YEARS AHEAD. CATEGORY 4,

1 THEY'RE A YEAR AHEAD. ET CETERA, ET CETERA, ET CETERA, ET 2 CETERA. 3 SO, YOUR HONOR, IF THE TASK IS TO DECIDE WHETHER QUALCOMM 4 MAINTAINED ITS POSITION THROUGH INNOVATION, SKILL, TECHNOLOGY, 5 OR THROUGH ITS LICENSING PRACTICES, IT'S A LAY DOWN HAND. THEY 6 HAVEN'T PROVEN ANYTHING WITH RESPECT TO OUR LICENSING PRACTICES 7 THAT HAD ANY IMPACT ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF THIS TECHNOLOGY. 8 AND SO FOR THOSE REASONS, I THINK THE EVIDENCE IS CRYSTAL 9 CLEAR, THERE CAN'T BE ANY VIOLATION BASED ON WHAT THEY 10 PRESENTED. EVEN THOUGH YOUR HONOR GAVE THEM A ROADMAP, THEY 11 WERE UNABLE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO MEET THE BURDEN. 12 BUT NOW I WANT TO TALK FOR JUST A FEW MINUTES ABOUT 13 REMEDIES, AND I WANT TO START WITH A SLIDE FROM 14 PROFESSOR SHAPIRO BECAUSE THEY SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF 15 EXISTING CONDUCT IS ENOUGH FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND THAT'S 16 JUST NOT THE LAW. 17 AND PROFESSOR SHAPIRO SAID WAS IF THE COST TO AN OEM OF 18 LOSING ACCESS TO CHIPS WERE NIL, THEN THE NO LICENSE, NO CHIPS 19 POLICY WOULD HAVE NO BITE, AND, THEREFORE, QUALCOMM WOULD NOT 20 BE ABLE TO ELEVATE ROYALTIES AND THE REST OF THE PROGRAM FALLS 2.1 APART. 22 WELL, THAT MEANS IF OUALCOMM LACKS MARKET POWER, THEN ITS 23 PRACTICES ARE NOT CAPABLE OF ANY HARM. AND THE LAW ISN'T THAT IT'S ENOUGH TO SHOW CONDUCT 24 25 CONTINUING. YOU HAVE TO SHOW A CONTINUING VIOLATION. A

Τ	VIOLATION REQUIRES MARKET POWER.
2	AND THE FTC HASN'T PRODUCED ANY EVIDENCE OF MARKET POWER
3	AFTER 2016, AS THIS NEXT SLIDE SHOWS.
4	PROFESSOR SHAPIRO WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR. NOTHING IN 2017,
5	NOTHING IN 2018.
6	AND I'M NOT JUST QUIBBLING HERE, YOUR HONOR. IT'S NOT AS
7	THOUGH HE WAS SHOWING A STRAIGHT LINE UP FOR QUALCOMM WITHIN A
8	YEAR OF TRIAL. THAT'S NOT IT.
9	HE WAS SHOWING A STRAIGHT LINE DOWN, DIMINISHING MARKET
10	SHARE IN 2014, 2015, 2016.
11	AND HIS ANALYSIS STOPS COMPLETELY IN 2016.
12	SO THERE'S CURRENTLY NO BASIS IN THE RECORD, OR THE
13	EVIDENCE, FOR ANY FORM OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, YOUR HONOR, IF YOU
14	CAN'T SHOW SOME EVIDENCE OF MARKET POWER NOW OR WITHIN MONTHS
15	OF NOW, WHICH THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN.
16	AND WE KNOW THAT 5G IS GOING TO BE COMPETITIVE. YOU HEARD
17	A LOT OF TESTIMONY ABOUT THAT. MR. MOYNIHAN SAYS MEDIATEK HAS
18	A CHIP, AND IT'LL BE OUT.
19	MS. EVANS SAYS INTEL HAS A CHIP, AND IT'LL BE OUT.
20	MR. ROGERS SAW A HUAWEI CHIP DISPLAYED LAST JANUARY, A
21	YEAR AGO, AT THE MOBILE WORLD CONGRESS.
22	SO WE KNOW THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE STIFF COMPETITION FROM
23	WELL FUNDED ADVERSARIES, LIKE HUAWEI, IN THIS FIELD NO MATTER
24	WHAT.
25	ANOTHER POINT. THEY ARE ASKING YOUR HONOR TO THROW OUT

1	HUNDREDS OF LICENSE AGREEMENTS, RENDER THEM UNENFORCEABLE, THAT
2	HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED WITH THIRD PARTIES OVER THE PAST 10 TO 15
3	YEARS.
4	THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY PLAUSIBLE CHIP LEVERAGE AS TO
5	ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES I'VE GOT ON THE BOARD. THEY'RE
6	NOT CLAIMING ANY MARKET POWER IN WCDMA.
7	MANY OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS THAT YOUR HONOR HAS BEFORE
8	HER ARE WCDMA.
9	NO CLAIM OF MARKET POWER IN LTE BEFORE 2011.
LO	NO CLAIM OF MARKET POWER IN CDMA BEFORE 2006.
L1	YOUR HONOR CLARIFIED THAT WHEN PROFESSOR SHAPIRO WAS HERE.
L2	NO CLAIM OF MARKET POWER NOW OR ANY TIME AFTER 2016.
L3	AND ALL TRENDS ARE SHOWING MARKET SHARE DIMINISHING.
L 4	THE CPLA LICENSES, YOUR HONOR, ARE THE ONES MR. ROGERS
L5	ADDRESSED FRIDAY. THEY WERE EXECUTED UNDER THE NDRC
L 6	RECTIFICATION PLAN AND APPROVED BY THE NDRC.
L7	THE SAMSUNG AGREEMENT IS TO THE SAME EFFECT. IT WAS
L8	NEGOTIATED IN 2018. I'VE GOT A SLIDE ON THAT IN A MINUTE.
L 9	BUT MY POINT IS THAT EVEN IF YOUR HONOR WERE TO FIND SOME
20	VIOLATION OUT OF ALL THIS, WHICH I DON'T THINK YOU CAN, THERE
21	CLEARLY IS NO EVIDENCE AS TO ANY OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENTS IN
22	THESE CATEGORIES TO SUPPORT ANYTHING.
23	AND NOW MY SAMSUNG SLIDE, LET'S GO TO SAMSUNG, IS SIMPLY
24	THIS: THE TWO TOP PEOPLE, MR. AHN'S A LAWYER, MR. LEE IS NOT,
25	THE TWO TOP PEOPLE THAT NEGOTIATED THE SAMSUNG AGREEMENT THAT

1 WAS LATER PROVIDED TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT SAID THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG WITH OUR NEGOTIATION, NO PRESSURE, NO NOTHING. I 2 3 WASN'T COERCED, THERE WAS NO TALK OF CHIP SUPPLY. 4 AND I THINK IMPORTANT I THINK HERE TO RECOGNIZE, YOUR 5 HONOR, AS PROFESSOR NEVO SAID, IN A MARKET LIKE THIS THAT'S 6 RAPIDLY CHANGING AND THAT'S BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL, COURT 7 INTERVENTION -- GOD BLESS YOU --8 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 9 MR. VAN NEST: -- COURT INTERVENTION, IF IT'S GOING 10 TO HAPPEN AT ALL, HAS TO BE MEASURED. IT MUST BE MEASURED. 11 THEY'VE PROVIDED NO EVIDENCE THAT WHAT THEY WANT WILL HAVE 12 ANY EFFECT ON THE MARKET THAT'S POSITIVE. 13 AND YOU KNOW NOW THAT SINCE THE HANDSET LEVEL LICENSING 14 AND COMPONENT LICENSING, THE WAY IT'S DONE NOW -- BLESS YOU 15 AGAIN --16 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 17 MR. VAN NEST: -- HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, THAT I WOULD 18 URGE THE COURT TO REVIEW THE TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR NEVO ON 19 THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THE FTC HAS PRESENTED ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO 20 JUSTIFY THE SWEEPING ALMOST BREATHTAKING REMEDY THEY WANT BASED 21 ON THE PALTRY EVIDENCE THEY PROVIDED. 22 AND SO NOW, YOUR HONOR, FOR ALL THE REASONS I PROVIDED IN 23 MY DISCUSSION THIS AFTERNOON, AS WELL AS OUR PRETRIAL BRIEF, 24 OUR PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS, I THINK IT'S 25 PRETTY CLEAR, THE FTC FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN ON EVERY

1	ELEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AND HASN'T SHOWN THAT ANY OF THE REMEDIES
2	IT SEEKS ARE NECESSARY, TAILORED, OR IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AT
3	ALL.
4	AND SO FOR THOSE REASONS, WE MOVE FOR THE JUDGMENT OF
5	DISMISSAL UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(C).
6	AND I THANK YOUR HONOR FOR YOUR ATTENTION THIS AFTERNOON
7	AND THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL. I HOPE I'VE BEEN HELPFUL.
8	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. THANK YOU VERY
9	MUCH.